Octavian Strîmbu et Patrick Gonzalez publient dans le Journal of Public Economic Theory

15 septembre 2017

Octavian Strîmbu et Patrick Gonzalez publient dans le Journal of Public Economic Theory un article intitulé "Does transparency reduce political corruption".

Octavian Strîmbu a fait son doctorat au département d'économique sous la direction de Patrick Gonzalez. Il est présentement chargé d'enseignement à la Geneva School of Economics and Management.

Voici un résumé de l'article:

Does a better monitoring of officials' actions (transparency) lower the incidence of corruption? Using a common agency game with imperfect information, we show that the answer depends on the measure of corruption that one uses. More transparency lowers the prevalence of corruption but raises the average bribe as it motivates the corruptor to bid more aggressively for the agent's favor. We show that transparency affects the prevalence of corruption at the margin through a competitive effect and an efficiency effect.