Joniada Milla: (Un)Intended Effects of a Teacher Bonus Tournament
Heure: 10h30 à 11h45
Description de l'événement
Invitation par: Catherine Michaud-Leclerc
I use a sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD) to estimate the causal effect of a group teacher bonus program in the Chilean secondary education that allocates a pay increase through a biannual tournament, is long-lived and universal in nature. The program design ensures internal and external validity, which is rare in studies that rely on RDD. Using administrative longitudinal data, I evaluate the effect of two pay-increase sizes on teacher and student outcomes. I find that the pay increase improves only high-stakes student reading scores in private schools that are used (together with math and natural science scores) in bonus allocation the following year. The pay increase has no effect on municipal school students’ scores, low-stakes test scores in any school type, or student sorting. There is only weak suggestive evidence of teacher retention efforts by winner schools. I also find that the higher pay increase does not have an additional effect above and beyond the lower one. The results have direct policy implications.