Les déjeuners de l'économie politique

Conférencier(e) :

Invité par :

Arthur Silve et Érick Duchesne ont le plaisir de vous inviter à la prochaine séance des "déjeuners de l'économie politique", le mercredi 19 décembre, à 9am, au local DES-2237. 

Le papier proposé est : Guns, Environment, and Abortion: How Single-Minded Voters Shape Politicians' Decisions, par Laurent Bouton, Paola Conconi, Francisco Pino, et Maurizio Zanardi.

Notez que Laurent Bouton offrira l'une des keynotes du prochain congrès de la SCSE : c'est une bonne occasion de se familiariser avec son travail.

Comme d'habitude,  le CEPCI et le Département d'économique vous offrent café et croissants.

Ci-dessous le résumé du papier. 

Abstract: We study how electoral incentives affect policy choices on secondary issues, which only minorities of voters care intensely about. We develop a model in which office and policy motivated politicians choose to support or oppose regulations on these issues. We derive conditions under which politicians flip-flop, voting according to their policy preferences at the beginning of their terms, but in line with the preferences of single-issue minorities as they approach re-election. To assess the evidence, we study U.S. senators’ votes on gun control, environment, and reproductive rights. In line with our model’s predictions, election proximity has a pro-gun effect on Democratic senators and a pro-environment effect on Republican senators. These effects only arise for non-retiring senators, who represent states where the single-issue minority is of intermediate size. Also in line with our theory, election proximity has no impact on senators’ decisions on reproductive rights, because of the presence of single-issue minorities on both sides.

Bonne lecture !