7 mai 2019

Lieu: DES-2237

Description de l'événement

Ce mardi 7 mai à 9h00, retrouvez les professeurs Arthur Silve et Érick Duchesne au local DES-2237 pour la dernière rencontre des "déjeuners de l'économie politique" de la session.

Le papier proposé pour lecture est: "Taxability and Trade", par Jason S. Davis.
Comme d'habitude, le Département d'économique et le CEPCI vous offrent café et croissants.

Ci-dessous le résumé du papier.

Abstract: The political economy of trade literature tends to conceive of the relationship between fiscal capacity and trade policy fairly simply: states that have limited fiscal capacity will be more likely to use tariffs to raise revenues given the lack of other means of doing so. This paper presents a model that complicates this story; what matters is not just overall levels of fiscal capacity, but the relative taxability of different domestic groups. In particular, while greater ability to tax the winners of freer trade makes freer trade more likely, greater ability to tax the losers of freer trade may actually make protectionism more likely. This follows because governments can use taxation to redistribute the revenues generated by any policy to better respond to the distributive politics game they face, provided that the revenues accrue to a party that is taxable. This generates a number of empirical implications for patterns of trade policy: for instance, we would expect trade policy to be biased towards factors, industries, and firm sizes that are easier to tax.

Retrouvez le papier ici.