2 octobre 2020

Heure: 12h45 - 13h45

Description de l'événement

Conférencier: Micael Castanheira (ULB)

Invité par: Arthur Silve et Arnaud Dellis (UQAM)

Attention, comme c'est un séminaire joint Laval - UQAM, l'horaire est modifié

Travail co-autoré avec : Steffen Huck (WZB & UCL), Johannes Leutgeb (WZB), Andrew Schotter (NYU)

While people on all sides of the political spectrum were amazed that Donald Trump won the Republican nomination this paper demonstrates that Trump’s victory was not a crazy event but rather the equilibrium outcome of a multi-candidate race where one candidate, the buffoon, is viewed as likely to self-destruct and hence unworthy of attack. We model such primaries as a truel (a three-way duel), solve for its equilibrium, and test its implications in the lab. We find that people recognize a buffoon when they see one and aim their attacks elsewhere with the unfortunate consequence that the buffoon has an enhanced probability of winning. This result is strongest amongst those subjects who demonstrate an ability to best respond suggesting that our results would only be stronger when this game is played by experts and for higher stakes.