Répertoire du personnel administratif et enseignant

Markus Hermann, professeur d'économique à la Faculté des sciences sociales de l'Université Laval

Markus Herrmann

Département d’économique

Directeur de programmes de 3e cycle en économique, Professeur agrégé

418 656-2131, poste 2409

markus.herrmann@ecn.ulaval.ca

Pavillon J.-A.-DeSève Local 2286

Publications

Ewald, P.W., M. Herrmann, B. Roche, S.P. Brown, A. Lotem, F. Thomas et P.Heeb (2017), "Interventions to control the damage from infectious disease : an integration of ecological, evolutionary, and economic perspectives", Investors and Exploiters: Principles and Applications for Ecology and Economics, ed. L.-A. Giraldeau, M. Kosfeld, and P. Heeb. Strüngmann Forum Reports, vol. 21, J. Lupp, series editor. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Herrmann, Markus (2017), "The economics of public health in the presence of exploitation strategies.", Investors and Exploiters: Principles and Applications for Ecology and Economics, ed. L.-A. Giraldeau, M. Kosfeld, and P. Heeb. Strüngmann Forum Reports, vol. 21, J. Lupp, series editor. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Arjoon, Diane; Herrmann, Markus; Tilmant, Amaury (2016), "Sharing water and benefits in transboundary river basins", Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, vol. 20, pp. 2135-2150.1 

Desquilbet, Marion; Herrmann, Markus (2016), "The Dynamics of Pest Resistance Management: The Case of Refuge Fields for Bt Crops", Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 64(2), pp. 253–288.2

Hermann, Markus; Nkuiya, Bruno (2016), "Inducing optimal substitution between antibiotics under open access to the resource of antibiotic susceptibility", Health Economics, vol. 26 (6), pp. 703-723.3

Morin Chassé, Rémi; Hermann, Markus (2016), "On the multiplicity of open-loop strategies in a non-renewable natural resource duopoly", Resource and Energy Economics, Volume 46, November 2016, Pages 101–113.4

Barla, P., Lapierre, N., Dazimo, R.A., Herrmann, M. (2015), "Reducing Automobile Dependency on Campus Using Transport Demand Management: a Case Study for Quebec City", Canadian Public Policy/Analyse de politiques, mars, vol. 41, no 1, pp. 86-96, en savoir plus.

Laxminarayan, Ramanan; Herrmann, Markus (2015), "Biological resistance", Handbook on the Economics of Natural Resources , Halvorsen, R. and D. Layton (éditeurs),, Edward Elgar Publishing, Northampton, MA.

Markus Herrmann, Bruno Nkuiya, Anne-Renée Dussault (2013), "Innovation and antibiotic use within antibiotic classes: Market incentives and economic instruments", Resource and Energy Economics, Volume 35, Issue 4, November 2013, Pages 582-598.

Constantatos, Christos; Herrmann, Markus (2011), "Market Inertia and the Introduction of Green Products: Can Strategic Effects Justify the Porter Hypothesis?", Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 50, no 2, pp. 267-284.

Herrmann, Markus (2010), "Monopoly Pricing of an Antibiotic Subject to Declining Treatment Efficacy", Journal of Health Economics, vol. 29, no 1, pp. 137-150.

Herrmann, Markus; Laxminarayan, Ramanan (2010), "Antibiotic Effectiveness: New Challenges in Natural Resource Management", Annual Reviews of Resource Economics, vol. 2, 2010, pp. 125-138.

Herrmann, Markus; Gaudet, Gérard (2009), "The Economic Dynamics of Antibiotic Efficacy under Open Access", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 57, no 3, pp. 334-350.

1The equitable sharing of benefits in transboundary river basins is necessary to solve disputes among riparian countries and to reach a consensus on basin-wide development and management activities. Benefit-sharing arrangements must be collaboratively developed to be perceived not only as efficient, but also as equitable in order to be considered acceptable to all riparian countries. The current literature mainly describes what is meant by the term benefit sharing in the context of transboundary river basins and discusses this from a conceptual point of view, but falls short of providing practical, institutional arrangements that ensure maximum economic welfare as well as collaboratively developed methods for encouraging the equitable sharing of benefits. In this study, we define an institutional arrangement that distributes welfare in a river basin by maximizing the economic benefits of water use and then sharing these benefits in an equitable manner using a method developed through stakeholder involvement. We describe a methodology in which (i) a hydrological model is used to allocate scarce water resources, in an economically efficient manner, to water users in a transboundary basin, (ii) water users are obliged to pay for water, and (iii) the total of these water charges is equitably redistributed as monetary compensation to users in an amount determined through the application of a sharing method developed by stakeholder input, thus based on a stakeholder vision of fairness, using an axiomatic approach. With the proposed benefit-sharing mechanism, the efficiency–equity trade-off still exists, but the extent of the imbalance is reduced because benefits are maximized and redistributed according to a key that has been collectively agreed upon by the participants. The whole system is overseen by a river basin authority. The methodology is applied to the Eastern Nile River basin as a case study. The described technique not only ensures economic efficiency, but may also lead to more equitable solutions in the sharing of benefits in transboundary river basins because the definition of the sharing rule is not in question, as would be the case if existing methods, such as game theory, were applied, with their inherent definitions of fairness.

2We examine the optimal time-variant refuge policy to manage pest resistance to Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) crops in a finite, discrete-time horizon model. We identify analytically the intertemporal effects of refuge fields on the pest population and its susceptibility. The shape of the optimal refuge policy and whether or not pest susceptibility should be exhausted completely at the end of the time horizon depend crucially on the values of a cost premium of Bt seeds and the fitness cost of resistance (over mortality of resistant pests) and are addressed via numerical simulations. We demonstrate the importance of modeling the dynamics of the biological system accurately, of defining a diploid (and not haploid) biological model, and of using a discrete-time (rather than continuous-time) framework.

3This paper designs a bio-economic model to examine the use of substitute antibiotic drugs (analogs) sold by an industry that has open access to the resource of the antibiotic class's susceptibility (treatment effectiveness). Antibiotics are characterized by different expected recovery rates and production costs, which in conjunction with the class's treatment susceptibility determines their relative effectiveness. Our analysis reveals that the high-quality antibiotic drug loses its comparative advantage over time making the low-quality drug the treatment of last resort in the market equilibrium and the social optimum when antibiotic susceptibility cannot replenish. However, when antibiotic susceptibility is renewable, both antibiotics may be used in the long run, and the comparative advantage of the high-quality drug may be restored in the social optimum that allows lowering infection in the long run. We develop the optimal tax/subsidy scheme that would induce antibiotic producers under open access to behave optimally and account for the social cost of infection and value of antibiotic susceptibility. We show that the welfare loss associated with the uncorrected open-access allocation is highest; when the resource of antibiotic susceptibility is non-renewable, high morbidity costs are incurred by individuals, and low social discount rates apply. 

4We identify two possible open-loop equilibrium configurations for a non-renewable resource duopoly in a discrete-time framework. For the purpose of illustration, we characterize initial endowments of firms that allow for a maximum of two extraction periods. In the first possible equilibrium, the duopoly exists for two periods, while in the second possible equilibrium, the duopoly lasts only for one period and the firm with the higher initial endowment becomes a monopolist in the second and last period. As neither equilibrium configuration dominates the other for both firms at the same time, it is unclear whether firms acting simultaneously can coordinate on one particular configuration.

Curriculum

Ph. D. (Université de Montréal)

Curriculum vitae (PDF, 79 Ko)

Intérêts de recherche

  • Bioéconomie
  • Économie de l'environnement
  • Économie des ressources naturelles
  • Organisation industrielle